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Abstract
The emerging mass individualization [1] in series produced road vehicles, superseding mass customization,
entails an increase in variants. The question “How may the functional safety development effort, correspond-
ing to the variant numbers, be tackled while complying to the standard ISO 26262:2018? [2]” motives this
work.
The lever on containing the effort is most effective when applied in the development life-cycle as early as
possible. The initiating functional safety artifact is the item definition. Strategic clustering of variants into
a few or even a single item-definition(s) is feasible by exploiting platform development. Yet, the functional
safety development effort for each defined item may only be limited when basing all subsequent phases
on one single representative variant. In this work we particularly elaborate on answering the question
“Under what conditions can a representative variant be defined?”, accompanied by the notion of “How
is it defined?”. Therefore, we assess the ISO 26262:2018 [2] for deriving prerequisites on a representative
variant. Furthermore, we propose a structured and efficient method to determine representative variants
given vehicle parameters and a framing context. The method is exemplified for two easily comprehensible
use-case situations in drivetrain development. The characteristic equations may be used for future drivetrain
functional safety development.
Keywords: functional safety, ISO 26262, drivetrain, representative variant, worst-case, hazard analysis
and risk assessment
1. Introduction
As stated in the introduction of ISO 26262:2018 [2], the increasing technological complexity, software
content and mechatronics implementation in road vehicles entails an increase in risks due to systematic and
random hardware failures. Yet, safety, described as the absence of unreasonable risks, has become one of
the key factors for a consumer purchase decision [3, 4]. Thus, the automotive industry is urged to ensure
safety. The ISO 26262:2018 [2] gives guidance for establishing functional safety in road vehicles. Therefore,
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it assumes a V-model [5] development process and standardizes thereupon the safety lifecycle process of
automotive manufacturers [6]. The second edition of the ISO 26262, [2] generalizes the management and
engineering activities, principles and techniques for passenger vehicles formulated in ISO 26262 first edition
[7] to road vehicles with a maximum gross weight of 3500 kg. See [8] for an overview of major changes
between ISO 26262:2011, i.e. first edition, [7] and ISO 26262:2018, i.e. second edition, [2], or e.g. [9] for a
review of ISO 26262:2011 [7].
Let alone the increasing complexity of software-intensive safety-critical embedded systems [6], the in-
crease in complexity attributes significantly to the growth of variants of vehicle derivates [10]. In modular
development of series produced road vehicles multiple variants derive from the same platforms to fulfill spe-
cific customer needs. For a review of product design paradigm refer to [1]. Mass customization in series
produced vehicles considers variable hardware, e.g. lights, drivetrain components, the wheelbase, the ground
clearance, behavior, e.g. parameterisations or different operational modes, or even entire functions.
Assuring safety, i.e. compliance to [2], for road vehicles with nowadays large variance and complex
embedded systems is costly and time-consuming [11]. The business and program management, however, are
interested in achieving a high compliance coverage while keeping costs low [6]. Multiple variants may be
clustered in a single item definition on the basis of common requirements, see [2] Part 3 Section 5. To limit
development effort, the subsequent phases of functional safety development according to ISO 26262:2018 [2]
have to be pursued with only a few representative variants of the cluster. Yet, how and on what basis is a
representative variant defined?
Yoe [12], for example, discusses representative scenarios commonly employed in risk analysis. Among
the failure-scenarios are the best-case, most likely and worst-case scenario. Thereby, the worst-case scenario
is the one best-known [12]. Design of experiment (DoE) targets towards minimizing the number of test
candidates while concurrently acquiring most information by appropriately combining input factors [13, 14].
In the context of validation testing, a worst-case parameter combination permits to draw the conclusion if
or if not a device is usable, see e.g. IEC 62366:2007 [15] Annex D or [16], a process at the limit of acceptable
operating conditions yields a product as specified, see e.g. [17], or a system performs within the specified
bounds, see [18].
This publication elaborates in the first part on the considerations to be made to determine a representative
variant that is in accordance to [2], see Section 2.1. Based thereupon, an efficient method is formulated that
agrees with [2] in Section 2.2. In the second part of this work, basic models for selecting the representative
variant for functional safety development for the drivetrain are derived, see Section 3. For an application
example, a set of variants are clustered as one item. Their use-case dependent representative variants are
determined in Section 3.3. Concluding remarks are stated in Section 4.
2
2. A representative variant according to ISO 26262
2.1. Basic considerations to derive a representative variant
According to hazard theory, see e.g. [19], a hazardous event consists of the three necessary elements: a
hazard source, an (initiating) mechanism and a target. In the context of [2], the hazard source is the item
described in the item definition at vehicle level according to ISO 26262:2018 [2]-3 Sec. 5. The initiating
mechanism is the malfunction of the item in the context of a certain operational mode or situation, stating
a use-case. The target is the potentially harmed human(s).
To define a hazardous event, the item without internal safety mechanisms is evaluated with the hazard
analysis and risk assessment (HARA), described in ISO 26262:2018 [2] Part 3 Sec. 6. According to [2] Part
3 Sec. 6.4.3, hazards are classified conservatively with respect to severity (S), probability of exposure (E)
and controllability (C), “i.e. whenever there is a reasonable doubt, a higher S, E or C classification is to be
chosen.” [2]. Thereby, [2] circumvents the shortfall of not providing a truly objective rating methodology,
yet, instead leaving the ASIL classification to the skills and the mental model of domain technical experts
[20]. Moreover, the“ level of rigor required for higher ASIL values is considerably high as compared to a
lower ASIL value. Therefore, the automotive industry is always driven towards lower ASIL values in order
to keep their development costs down. This inherent bias can also sometimes lead to an inconsistency in the
ASIL ratings.”[20].
Nevertheless, to determine S, the potential harm caused to each person at risk is evaluated, see [2] Part 3
Sec. 6.4.3.2. If applicable, the potential injuries shall be clustered to derive the highest S-classification. A
structured aid to determine S is the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) [21] provided e.g. in Appendix B of
[2] Part 3. Alternative ratings may be found e.g. in [22] Table E.1. Also, to classify S [23] tabulates data
of vehicle velocities and collision types to severity. Yet, the parameters are not sufficiently exhaustive [20]
to objectively determine S. According to [2] Part 3 Sec 6.4.2.1 “The operational situations and operating
modes in which an item’s malfunctioning behavior will result in a hazardous event shall be described; ...”.
Determining E thus requires analysis of e.g. driving scenarios and conditions. The German Verband Der
Automobilindustrie e.V. (VDA) has gathered statistical data and derived the Situationskatalog E-Parameter
nach ISO 26262-3 [24] for representative use-case scenarios in conjunction with E-classifications.
The controllability (C) is classified based on the probability that a representative driver is able to retain
or regain control of the vehicle if a hazardous event occurs, or other road users in the vicinity are able to
influence the situation such to avoid the mishap, see [2] Part 3 Sec 6.4.3.8 and Annex B.4. The road user
or driver ability to act is the key determining factor, i.e. human factors given technical means, see e.g.
[25, 26, 27]. In practice the controllability may be evaluated by expert judgment of well-experienced testers
accompanied with statistical data. However, even on basis of well-tabulated data, classification is prone to
inter-rateability and intra-rateability variations [28], see [20], further justifying a pessimistic classification.
The situations and modes are identical for the unity of the variants of one item given the same require-
ments. Thus, E is independent from technical realizations. Yet, the severity S and the controllability C both
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depend on the technical realization of the item, see e.g. [20, 29, 30, 25, 27]. I.e. the hazardous situation
needs to be classified for the ASIL with each of the variants of the item definition.
However, [2] Part 3 Sec. 6.4.4.1 states that “A safety goal shall be determined for each hazardous event
with an ASIL evaluated in the hazard analysis and risk assessment. If similar safety goals are determined,
these may be combined into one safety goal.” The amendment “The ASIL determined for the hazardous
event shall be assigned to the corresponding safety goal. If similar safety goals are combined into a single
one, in accordance with 6.4.4.1, the highest ASIL shall be assigned to the combined safety goal.”, [2] Part
3 Sec. 6.4.4.2, explicitly encourages clustering. Consequently, the clustering of similar hazardous events is
compliant to [2]. Thereby, the worst-case hazardous event, i.e. the one with the highest ASIL-classification,
is representative for the cluster.
Again, two of the three hazard elements (hazard source, initiating mechanism, and target) are vehicle-
independent: the use-case and target. Given these two hazard elements, the variant with the biggest
hazardous potential completes the worst-case event. On basis of these three elements, a representative
ASIL-classification is assessed.
2.2. Efficiently constructing a representative variant
How can the worst-case variant be determined efficiently? This implies that performing a HARA for each
variant needs to be unnecessary; instead, one HARA on basis of the worst-case variant shall suffice.
Constructing a worst-case scenario relies on conservatism to credit for uncertainty in input parameters
and the analysts judgment to choose that set of input values that yields the worst possible outcome from
a model, see [12]. According to Gardner et al. [17] “The worst-case approach [...] allows examination of
all of the critical [...] variables together, thus ensuring that additive effects and interactions are tested for.”
Loring [16] analyzes the definitions of worst-case scenario in the context of usability testing for medical
devices based on IEC 62366:2007 [15] Annex D and the Guidance Document Applying Human Factors and
Usability Engineering to Medical Devices [31]. She summarizes that for both, risk assessment and validation,
parameters with the highest potential for harm, in this work’s context highest ASIL, and those of actual use
ought to be simulated or chosen.
Actual use-case situations are described in the agreed-upon situation catalogue Situationskatalog E-
Parameter nach ISO 26262-3 [24]. Applying [24] leads to worst-case environmental parameters. According
to ISO 26262:2018 [2] Part 3 Sec. 6.4.3.8 NOTE 3 cases of reasonably foreseeable misuse are also to be
considered. Thereby, cases of reasonably foreseeable misuse need to be derived from actual use-case situations
such that the parameters result from a boundary value analysis. The example of “not keeping the required
distance to the vehicle in front as a common behavior” is provided in [2] Part 3 Sec. 6.4.3.8 NOTE 3.
It derives from the actual use-case of two vehicles following another. Moreover, this case is an observed
common behavior. Note that these parameters are variant-independent, yet, important for constructing the
worst-case scenarios.
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Figure 1: Process to determine representative worst-case variant in use-case situation from use-case, safety-critical characteristic
and vehicle parameters.
Figure 1 depicts the steps for determining the representative variant. As a first step, the framing use-
case is defined, i.e. the operational mode, driving scenario and conditions in which a fault occurs. Next, the
characteristic that determines the biggest hazardous potential in a given use-case is formulated. Based on
the analysts judgment [12], a physical model is constituted. Therefore, contextual assumptions are drawn
to filter key influential parameters. Next, the to be assessed characteristic is modeled mathematically.
Assume the general case that multiple vehicle-parameters characterize the variants. Moreover, each pa-
rameter is independent and has a certain range of validity. Even with simplifying assumptions, the parameters
may define a high-dimensional, nonlinear mathematical model. For efficient approaches to determine the
global worst-case parameter combination refer to [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. With the worst-case parameter
combination the worst-case representative variant is stated.
Alternatively, the item definition may detail the parametric realization of specific variants. Consequently,
the mathematical model can be evaluated directly for each variant. A direct comparison of the characteristic
value for the variants leads to the one with the biggest hazardous potential.
2.3. Consequence for subsequent phases
With the worst-case representative variant at hand, the hazardous situations are evaluated, their ASIL
derived and the safety goals formulated, see [2], Part 3, Sec. 6. According to [2], Part 3, Sec. 7.2 the safety
measures developed within the scope of the functional safety concept need to comply with the safety goals.
Hence, the safety measures are developed according to the representative variant. Thereby, these are stated
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comprehensively. In accordance with the functional safety concept, the product development at system level
is pursued on basis of the worst-case representative variant. The safety analysis as part of phase [2] Part 3
Sec. 6.4 may be used to detail variant-specifics.
The integration and testing phase, see [2] Part 4 Sec. 7 is variant-independent. A worst-case approach
does not guarantee completeness of verification.
The safety validation is the final development phase at system level. It provides the evidence that the
safety goals are achieved at the vehicle level by means of the integrated safety measures. Validation of safety
goals is applied to the item integrated at the vehicle level and the validation plan includes test procedures for
each safety goal with a pass/fail criterion. Thereby, the evidence of appropriateness of the functional safety
concept is provided. [2] Part 4 Sec. 8 stresses that the representative context and representative variant
suffice for validation, see particularly [2] Part 4 Sec. 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.
3. Representative variant for functional safety drivetrain development
Within the following, models characterizing a vehicle’s hazardous potential in the domain of drivetrain
development are derived. We specifically study the use-cases “drivetrain fault entailing an unintended
acceleration with, without loss of traction”, respectively. In conjunction with vehicle parameters these use-
cases state sufficiently complex scenarios. On the basis of well-established assumptions, the characteristics
are formulated with key vehicle parameters. These are in agreement with the findings of [29, 30, 25].
Note that the process for use-case situation assessment of a fault unintentionally decelerating a road
vehicle is as described within the following. One merely needs to replace the accelerating with the decelerating
torque and the applicable transmission ratios.
3.1. Use-Case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction”
3.1.1. The framing use-case scenario assumptions
The scenario of driving a 90◦-turn on an inner city road with low friction constitutes the underlying
worst-case driving situation. The latter condition is listed as FS020 Driving on road with low friction. Loss
of traction is facilitated due to a friction coefficient of µ < 0.5 + /−0.1. The situation is evaluated as E3, see
[24]. For this analysis, a friction coefficient of µ = 0.4 is assumed. A 90◦-turn minimizes the curve radius
to approximately R = 4 m. The road bank angle is negligible for the considered inner-city road. In [38],
Chapter 8.5.2 the minimum curve radius is correlated to the driving velocity. One finds that a velocity of
approximately V = 12.12 kph correlates to a curve with a radius of R = 4 m. The drivetrain faults to allow
the maximum engine torque. The acceleration is large enough to overcome traction. Moreover, the mass of
the variant is the curb weight.
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3.1.2. Characteristic of hazardous potential
According to friction circle theory, see e.g. [39, 40], the exchangeable forces between a tire and the road
in the contact patch are bound by the friction force Fµ:
F 2⊥ + F
2
‖ ≤ F 2µ . (1)
F‖ and F⊥ are the accelerating (longitudinal) forces and the cornering (transversal) forces, respectively.
Traction is overcome if
F 2⊥+F
2
‖
F 2µ
> 1. When at least one wheel pair of a vehicle loses traction, i.e. the front
or rear wheels, it diverges from its original driving path. Consequently it releases its hazardous potential to
road users. We propose
Pµ =
F 2⊥ + F
2
‖
F 2µ
, (2)
to characterize the hazardous potential of each variant.
Note, the vehicle parameters that best describe the hazardous potential of a vehicle are the kinetic energy,
the maximum acceleration and the friction, see [29, 30, 25]. The kinetic energy of the vehicle-system consists
of the kinetic energy of the drivetrain and the vehicle in motion. Only due to the tire forces, the vehicle can
translate the drivetrain energy, i.e. acceleration, into controllable kinetic energy of the vehicle in motion.
Also, the kinetic energy of the vehicle in motion can only be controlled by means of the tires. Hence, the
controllability depends on the ability to exchange forces between the road and the vehicle to maintain an
intended driving path. If the left-hand side of Eq. 1 exceeds its right-hand side, excess hazardous kinetic
energy is in the system, which is, moreover, uncontrollable. Thus, a high value of Pµ correlates to a big
hazardous potential and a higher classification of S and C.
3.1.3. Physical Model
β
α˙
R
CGFA RA
V
δ
Figure 2: Kinematic single track model
The vehicle is modeled physically with the nonlinear kinematic single
track model [41]. See e.g. [39, 42, 40] for further discussions of the
model. Stationary steering is assumed. Key assumptions for this work
are that the front and rear wheel pairs are modeled as a single wheel
at each axle, see figure 2. The mass of the vehicle mveh is concentrated
at the center of gravity (CG). Moreover, roll dynamics and pitching are
neglected. Aerodynamic forces are neither considered. While accelerating
in a curve, the curve radius R, the steering angle δ and the side slip angle
β are time-invariant. This implies that the yaw rate α˙ varies.
3.1.4. Mathematical Model
Based on the single track model, the equations of motion are constituted in Appendix A. From these, i.e.
Eqs. (A.13) and (A.14), expressions for F‖, F⊥ and Fµ are derived for the front and the rear axle, indicated
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with the subscripts FA and RA, respectively. With Eq. (2) the hazardous potential is stated for the front
and the rear axle:
Pµ,FA =
F 2⊥,FA + F
2
‖,FA
F 2µ,FA
, (3a)
Pµ,RA =
F 2⊥,RA + F
2
‖,RA
F 2µ,RA
, (3b)
Expression for F‖, F⊥ and Fµ may be found in Appendix A.
Note that if a vehicle is a front-wheel drive or rear-wheel drive, F‖,RA = 0, or F‖,FA = 0, respectively.
3.1.5. Selecting the worst-case variant
Given (3a), (3b) a worst-case analysis of the vehicle parameters is performed. Thereby, in case of unde-
termined variants, a worst-case parameter set is determined from which a worst case variant is constructed.
Alternatively, given a set of variants with fixed parameters, the worst-case variant is selected. The worst-
case parameter configuration or variant is the one for which Pµ,FA or Pµ,RA is biggest. Note that a separate
worst-case analysis is conducted for both cases: loss of traction of the front and rear axle, respectively.
3.2. Use-Case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration without loss of traction”
3.2.1. Use-case scenario assumptions
Maintaining traction implies that Pµ,FA < 1 and Pµ,RA < 1, compare (3a), (3b), respectively. The
worst-case driving scenario is driving straight ahead on a road with a normal friction coefficient, i.e. µ = 1.
According to [24] this situation evaluates as E4. A drivetrain faults to allow the maximum engine torque.
This fault entails an unintended acceleration. Note that, the mass of the vehicle is the curb weight.
3.2.2. Characteristic of hazardous potential
Given the scenario assumptions and description, the normalized accelerating potential of a vehicle
Pacc = Pacc,FA + Pacc,RA (4)
characterizes the hazardous potential of a variant.
Similar to Section 3.1, Pacc directly correlates to the the acceleration, and the friction; it indirectly
correlates to the kinetic energy: The bigger Pacc, the more kinetic energy is built up in a short period
of time. A vehicle with a higher acceleration overcomes distances to targets more swiftly. The time that
remains for a driver, passenger or other road users to control the situation is shorter for a vehicle with a
higher Pacc. Moreover, the kinetic energy in the moment of a mishap is generally bigger for bigger Pacc.
Thus, Pacc suits for characterizing the effects of the key vehicle parameters identified in e.g. [29, 30, 25] to
determine the hazardous potential, and correlating to the classification of S and C.
3.2.3. Physical Model
We employ the physical model described in Section 3.1.3. The steering angle δ, the yaw rate α˙ and the
side slip angle β diminish.
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3.2.4. Mathematical Model
The normalized accelerating potential of the front, and rear axle are
Pacc,FA =
F‖,FA
Fµ,FA
=
TFA l
rdyn µ g mveh lRA
, (5a)
Pacc,RA =
F‖,RA
Fµ,RA
=
TRA l
rdyn µ g mveh lFA
, (5b)
respectively. F‖ and Fµ are derived for the front and the rear axle in Appendix A. Hence, the accelerating
potential of a variant with dedicated engines for each axle is
Pacc =
l
rdyn µ g mveh
Tmot,FA iFA lFA + Tmot,RA iRA lRA
(lFA lRA)
. (6)
In case a single engine is employed, the accelerating potential is
Pacc =
l Tmot
rdyn µ g mveh
itot,FA lFA + itot,RA lRA
(lFA lRA)
. (7)
3.2.5. Selecting the worst-case variant
In case that variants are undetermined, the vehicle parameters are chosen to obtain the biggest Pacc.
Thereby, the conditions Pµ,FA < 1 and Pµ,RA < 1 need to be fulfilled. Note that F⊥ = 0. From these
parameters the worst-case variant is constructed.
In case the variants have been predetermined, for each variant the vehicle-parameters are set to maximize
Pµ,FA and Pµ,RA. Yet, the conditions Pµ,FA < 1 and Pµ,RA < 1 need to be fulfilled. Note that F⊥ = 0.
Proceeding, Pacc,FA, Pacc,RA are evaluated according to Eqs. (5a) and (5b), respectively, for each variant.
The worst-case variant is the one for which Pacc is biggest.
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3.3. Application example
As an application example, the variants listed in tables 1 and 2 are studied for their potential to constitute
representative variants for use-cases of a drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of
traction at front, rear axle, respectively, and drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss
of traction at rear axle. Note that for the AWD variants, the torque distribution to the front and rear axle
are fixed and at a ratio of 3 to 2, resulting in iDiff,FA, iDiff,RA.
3.3.1. Use-Case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction at front axle”
Given the set of variants and their parameters, and the use-case scenario as detailed in Section 3.1.1, Eq.
(3a) is evaluated for each variant. The procedure described in Section 3.1.5 holds. The results are tabulated
in Table 3. Thereby, for all variants, the first gear is selected to maximize itot.
One finds that the vehicle A-Class Hatchback 2017, FWD, see table 1 represents the worst-case variant
for the case of a drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction of the front axle.
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Variants:
B-Class
Sportcar 2017
RWD
D-Class
SUV v9 2017
AWD
F-Class
Sedan
AWD
A-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
Large
European Van
RWD
Pµ,FA 0.714 1.560 2.729 26.801 0.909
Variants:
B-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
European
Van
FWD
E-Class
Sedan 2017
AWD
E-Class
SUV 2017
AWD
C-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
Pµ,FA 19.233 11.768 2.758 1.685 10.933
Variants:
D-Class
Sedan 2017
FWD
D-Class
Minivan 2017
FWD
SUV
full size
AWD
Pµ,FA 15.797 8.823 1.052
Table 3: Pµ,FA for example variants, use-case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction at
front axle”.
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Variants:
B-Class
Sportcar 2017
RWD
D-Class
SUV v9 2017
AWD
F-Class
Sedan
AWD
A-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
Large
European Van
RWD
Pµ,RA 26.175 8.772 13.255 0.521 48.781
Variants:
B-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
European
Van
FWD
E-Class
Sedan 2017
AWD
E-Class
SUV 2017
AWD
C-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
Pµ,RA 0.521 0.521 8.625 8.972 0.521
Variants:
D-Class
Sedan 2017
FWD
D-Class
Minivan 2017
FWD
SUV
full size
AWD
Pµ,RA 0.521 0.521 4.889
Table 4: Pµ,RA for example variants, use-case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction at
rear axle”.
3.3.2. Use-Case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction at rear axle”
Given the set of variants and their parameters, and the use-case scenario as detailed in Section 3.1.1, Eq.
(3b) is evaluated for each variant. The procedure described in Section 3.1.5 holds. The results are listed in
Table 3. Thereby, for all variants, the first gear is selected to maximize itot.
One finds that the vehicle Large European Van, RWD, see table 1, represents the worst-case variant for
the case of a drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction of the rear axle.
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Variants:
B-Class
Sportcar 2017
RWD
D-Class
SUV v9 2017
AWD
F-Class
Sedan
AWD
A-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
Large
European Van
RWD
gear 3rd 2nd 2nd 3rd 4th
Pµ,FA 0 0.094 0.142 0.465 0
Pµ,RA 0.718 0.497 0.716 0 0.803
Pacc 0.847 1.011 1.222 0.682 0.896
Variants:
B-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
European
Van
FWD
E-Class
Sedan 2017
AWD
E-Class
SUV 2017
AWD
C-Class
Hatchback 2017
FWD
gear 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd
Pµ,FA 0.940 0.509 0.177 0.101 0.523
Pµ,RA 0 0 0.553 0.509 0
Pacc 0.969 0.714 1.164 1.030 0.723
Variants:
D-Class
Sedan 2017
FWD
D-Class
Minivan 2017
FWD
SUV
full size
AWD
gear 2nd 2nd 1st
Pµ,FA 0.756 0.434 0.168
Pµ,RA 0 0 0.699
Pacc 0.869 0.658 1.245
Table 5: Worst-case analysis for example variants, use-case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration without loss
of traction”.
3.3.3. Use-Case “Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration without loss of traction”
Given the set of variants and their parameters, and the use-case scenario as detailed in Section 3.2.1, the
worst-case Pacc, see Eq. (4), is evaluated for each variant. Thereby, the procedure of Section 3.2.5 holds.
The results are listed in Tables 5. Also, the gear, the corresponding total gear ratios for the front and rear
axle, itot,FA and itot,RA, Pµ,FA and Pµ,RA, Pacc,FA, Pacc,RA are listed.
One finds that the vehicle SUV full size, AWD, see table 2, represents the variant for the case of a
drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration without loss of traction.
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4. Conclusion
In this work we have found that a well-defined item definition is the key to limit the effort for functional
safety development. We have pointed out that in platform development common requirements allow cluster-
ing variants into a single item definition. A method to define cluster-representative variants for functional
safety development according to [2] has been developed. As a prerequisite the variants listed in the item
definition are to be put in a context, i.e. a use-case situation. To comply with ISO 26262:2018 [2] both, a
representative variant, defined by its configuration parameters, and the scenario conditions need to adhere
to the worst-case assumption. A key step in efficiently deriving a use-case specific representative worst-case
variant is to state a characteristic that relates parameters of the item to the hazard-source potential of the
item. Assuming the use-case scenario, a physical model shall be stated such to focus the item parameters
to the most relevant ones. Subsequent mathematical modeling specifies the characteristic in terms of item
parameters. An extreme value analysis leads to the sought worst-case, representative variant. It is to be
used for all the subsequent steps of functional safety development.
The method has been applied to assess two use-case situations in drivetrain functional safety development:
“Drivetrain fault entailing an unintended acceleration with loss of traction” and “Drivetrain fault entailing
an unintended acceleration without loss of traction”. For the two use-case situations characteristics have
been proposed that may be used for functional safety development.
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Appendix A. Derivation of mathematical model for considered drivetrain use-cases
Appendix A.1. Configuration
An accelerating vehicle, modeled with the nonlinear kinematic single track model [41], driving a curve of
radius R at a momentary velocity V , see Section 3, is considered. The vehicle is depicted in the x-y-plane
xI
yI
β
α˙
R′
β
R
CG
FA RA
Vδ
F‖,RA
F‖,FA
F⊥,RA
F⊥,FA
(a) x-y plane
CG
lFA lRA
RAFA FN
FN,FA FN,RA
rdyn
TRATFA
F‖,FA F‖,RA
(b) x-z plane
Figure A.3: kinematic single track model with forces acting on vehicle.
and x-z-plane in Fig. A.3a and Fig. A.3b, respectively. The forces acting on the wheels/axle are shown. F‖
and F⊥ are the longitudinal (accelerating) and transversal forces acting on the wheels. TFA, TRA denote
the front- and rear-wheel/axle torque, rdyn is the dynamic wheel radius, which, due to assuming stationarity
and neglecting pitching, is identical for the front and rear wheels and time invariant. FN , FN,FA and FN,RA
are the normal forces. The normal force FN = mvehg, with g = 9, 81
m
s2 , mveh denoting the gravitational
constant and the vehicle mass. Also, l = lFA + lRA is the wheel base. The Ackermann turning angle and
side slip angle are approximated as
tanδ =
l
R′
=
l√
R2 − l2RA
, (A.1)
tanβ =
lRA
R′
=
lRA√
R2 − l2RA
(A.2)
The inertial (I), vehicle-body (B) and front axle (FA) coordinate systems are depicted in Fig. A.4.
R(R˙, R¨) and β(β˙, β¨), are the curve radius and angular rotation of the vehicle body coordinate system with
respect to the inertial system, respectively, see Fig. A.4a. The FA-system is rotated about the B-system by
δ, see Fig. A.4b.
Appendix A.2. Transformation of coordinate systems
Following rotational coordinate transformations are relevant:
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yI
xI
xB
yB
β
β
R
RA
FA
CG
(a) Inertial (subscript I) and vehicle-body (subscript B) co-
ordinate systems
yB
xB
xFA
yFA
δ
δ
(b) Vehicle-body (subscript B) and front
axle (subscript FA) coordinate systems
Figure A.4: Coordinate systems
rFA = AF,BrB =

cosδ sinδ 0
−sinδ cosδ 0
0 0 1
 rB
rB = AB,IrI =

cosβ −sinβ 0
sinβ cosβ 0
0 0 1
 rI
rI : position vector in I-System
rB : position vector in B-System
rFA: position vector in FA-System
Appendix A.3. Forces acting on the wheels / axles
Position vector CG (center of gravity), FA, RA in I-, B-System
The coordinate vectors for the CG, the front- and rear-axle are, see Fig. A.3a:
x
I,
−−→
0CG
=

0
R
0
 xI,−−→0FA =

−lFAcosβ
lFAsinβ
0
 xI,−−→0RA =

lRAcosβ
−lRAsinβ
0

x
B,
−−→
0CG
=

−Rsinβ
Rcosβ
0
 xB,−−→0FA =

−lFA
0
0
 xB,−−→0RA =

lRA
0
0

Velocity & acceleration of CG
For the absolute velocity and acceleration of the CG one finds
x˙
I,
−−→
0CG
=
dx˙
I,
−−→
0CG
dt
+
(
α˙+ β˙
)
× x
B,
−−→
0CG
=

−R
(
α˙+ β˙
)
R˙
0
 (A.3)
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x˙
B,
−−→
0CG
= A
B,I
x˙
I,
−−→
0CG
=

−R
(
α˙+ β˙
)
cosβ − R˙ sinβ
R˙ cosβ −R
(
α˙+ β˙
)
sinβ
0
 (A.4)
x¨
I,
−−→
0CG
=
dx˙
I,
−−→
0CG
dt
+
(
α˙+ β˙
)
× x˙
I,
−−→
0CG
=
−2R˙
(
α˙+ β˙
)
−R
(
α¨+ β¨
)
R¨−R
(
α˙+ β˙
)2
0

(A.5)
x¨
B,
−−→
0CG
= A
B,I
x¨
I,
−−→
0CG
=
−cosβ
[
2R˙
(
α˙+ β˙
)
+R
(
α¨+ β¨
)]
− sinβ
[
R¨−R
(
α˙+ β˙
)2]
−sinβ
[
2R˙
(
α˙+ β˙
)
+R
(
α¨+ β¨
)]
+ cosβ
[
R¨−R
(
α˙+ β˙
)2]
0

(A.6)
As stated in Section 3.1.3, the accelerating vehicle follows a curve of constant R with velocity V (t); thus,
α¨ 6= 0. Moreover, stationary steering is assumed, i.e. β˙ = 0. Thus
R =
V
β˙ + α˙
=
V
α˙
(A.7)
Hence, Eq. (A.3) to (A.6) become
x˙
I,
−−→
0CG
=

−R α˙
0
0
 =

−V
0
0
 (A.8)
x˙
B,
−−→
0CG
=

−Rα˙ cosβ
−R α˙ sinβ
0
 =

−V cosβ
−V sinβ
0
 (A.9)
x¨
I,
−−→
0CG
=

−Rα¨
−Rα˙2
0
 (A.10)
x¨
B,
−−→
0CG
=

−cosβ [Rα¨] + sinβ [Rα˙2]
−sinβ [Rα¨]− cosβ [Rα˙2]
0
 (A.11)
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Conservation of momentum in body coordinate system in CG
For this system the equations for conservation of momentum and angular momentum about the center of
gravity are:
mvehx¨B,−−→0CG =
∑
i
Fi,B (A.12)
mveh

−cosβ [Rα¨] + sinβ [Rα˙2]
−sinβ [Rα¨]− cosβ [Rα˙2]
0
 =

0
0
−FN
+

−F‖,RA
F⊥,RA
FN,RA
+

cosδ −sinδ 0
sinδ cosδ 0
0 0 1


−F‖,FA
F⊥,FA
FN,FA
 =
=

−F‖,RA − F‖,FAcosδ − F⊥,FAsinδ
F⊥,RA − F‖,FAsinδ + F⊥,FAcosδ
−FN + FN,RA + FN,FA

(A.13)
dLCG,B
dt
= lFA,B × FFA,B + FRA,B × lRA,B =
−F‖,FAcosδ − F⊥,FAsinδ
−F‖,FAsinδ + F⊥,FAcosδ
FN,FA
×

−lFA
0
0
+

−F‖,RA
F⊥,RA
FN,RA
×

lRA
0
0
 =
(
0;FN,RAlRA − FN,FAlFA;−F⊥,RAlRA + (−F‖,FAsinδ + F⊥,FAcosδ)lFA
)T
(A.14)
With
dLCG
dt
= (0; 0; α¨ mveh 0)
T
= 0 (A.15)
From Eqs. (A.14), (A.13) one finds that
F⊥,FA =
F‖,FAR (lFAsinδcosβ − lRAsin (β − δ))− F‖,RARlRAsinβ − V 2lRAmveh
R (lFAcosβcosδ + lRAcos (β − δ)) , (A.16)
F⊥,RA =
−lFA
(
F‖,FARsinβ + F‖,RARsinβcosδ + V 2mvehcosδ
)
R (lFAcosβcosδ + lRAcos (β − δ)) . (A.17)
The second entry of Eq. (A.14) and the third entry of Eq. (A.13) yield that
FN,FA =
lRA
l
FN , (A.18a)
FN,RA =
lFA
l
FN . (A.18b)
The friction force correlates to the normal force according to Fµ = µ FN . µ = µ(µ
?, wT , hT ) is the
friction coefficient that depends on the road-tire friction coefficient µ?, the tire width wT and the height of
the tire wall hT . Within the scope of this work, we assume µ = µ
? and neglect the influence of wT and hT .
For each axle, TX = F‖,X rdyn with X ∈ {FA;RA} holds. If a vehicle has a single engine and a differential
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gear to distribute the torque Tmot to the front and rear axle, the total transmission ratios for the front and
rear axle are:
itot,FA = igear iDiff,FA =
nmot
n
iDiff,FA =
TFA
Tmot
, (A.19a)
itot,RA = igear iDiff,FA =
nmot
n
iDiff,RA =
TRA
Tmot
, (A.19b)
respectively. Thus, the longitudinal forces are
F‖,FA =
Tmot itot,FA
rdyn
, (A.20a)
F‖,RA =
Tmot itot,RA
rdyn
, (A.20b)
respectively. If dedicated engines for the front and rear axle are used instead,
F‖,FA =
Tmot,FA iFA
rdyn
, (A.21a)
F‖,RA =
Tmot,RA iRA
rdyn
, (A.21b)
respectively.
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